Going to the grocery market or seafood restaurants like Red Lobster– there are lobsters in a tank- it doesn’t take much assessing of the situation to find that these lobsters are solemnly petrified. In the essay, Consider the Lobster, by David Foster Wallace, the author argues for both sides, whether or not to eat lobster. Some believe lobsters cannot feel what is happening to them when placed in boiling water, nor do they have any preference for being cooked, similar to how some worms have no preference for being cut in half, for it does not affect them. However, lobsters are known for exhibiting their preferences. It’s not that eating lobster is unethical- but what forgoes the death of a lobster is unethical and immoral.
Wallace does not provide one definitive answer to the question but lets the readers come up with their answers using the arguments Wallace brings forth to defend both sides. As Wallace journeys the reader through his experience of going to the MLF (Maine Lobster Festival), he provides hysterical hypocrisy in his adventure. When speaking on the advertising by the Maine Lobster Promotion Council, “‘It is emphasized over and over in presentations and pamphlets at the festival that lobster meat has fewer calories, less cholesterol, and less saturated fat than chicken. And in the Main Eating Tent, you can get a four-ounce cup of melted butter, a bag of chips, and a soft drink’” (Wallace 238).
As previously mentioned, lobsters can be frequently spotted showcased in grocery markets or seafood restaurants. Often crammed in a tank with minimum space, rubber bands wrapped around their claws; then someone chooses which lobster they want as they stare at them like a little kid picking out a Christmas present through a shop window display. But why not see chickens in a cage at Chick-fil-A or, similar to lobsters, live fish in a tank at a grocery market? Instead, chicken and fish are already dead. For the lobster, it’s a more inhumane way of relegating its death to a game of pick-and-choose. (In a footnote, “‘Is it significant that “lobster,” “fish,” and “chicken” are our culture’s words for both the animal and the meat, whereas most mammals seem to require euphemisms like “beef” and “pork” that help us separate the meat we eat from the living creature the meat once was?’” (Wallace 247).) This question, inquired by Wallace to the reader, encourages the reader to think about whether the words we use when talking about different mammals- make the slightest difference in how we interact with and perceive them. Because everyday people won’t usually think of the question, it helps formulate their answer to Wallace’s question- furthering confidence in their opinion on the topic or possibly changing their opinion.
Wallace delves into the more philosophical aspects of pain and its subjective experience felt by all mammals. “‘Since pain is a subjective mental experience, we do not have direct access to anyone or anything’s pain, but our own; and even just the principles by which we can infer that other human beings experience pain and have a legitimate interest in not feeling pain involve hard-core philosophy- metaphysics, epistemology, value theory, ethics.’” (Wallace 246). Furthermore, Wallace mentions the complexity of understanding animals’ pain and what hurts an animal- without them having the use of language to communicate that pain and hurt- physically, mentally, and emotionally. “‘The fact that even the most highly evolved nonhuman mammals can’t use language to communicate with us about their subjective mental experience is only the first layer of additional complication in trying to extend our reasoning about pain and morality to animals.’” (Wallace 246).
The reader has comparisons shown- by Wallace, which ameliorates- the reasoning of the differences and similarities between humans’ and lobster’s subjective experiences of pain. “‘However stuporous a lobster is, it comes alarmingly to life when placed in boiling water. If you’re tilting it from a container into the steaming kettle, the lobster will sometimes try to cling to the sides of the container or even hook its claws over the kettle’s rim like a person trying to keep from going over the edge of a roof.” Moreover, “‘The lobster, in other words, behaves very much as you or I would behave if plunged into boiling water.’” (Wallace 247-248).
As this comparison establishes, the lobster’s behavior when being plunged into boiling water is, of course, very similar to how a human would react, or any living creature for that matter. Wallace explains the criterion ethicists use for determining whether a living creature has the capacity (physically, mentally, and emotionally) to suffer and has genuine interests that may or may not be a human moral duty to consider. These “interests” mean strong and legitimate preferences, which require some degree of consciousness and response to stimuli that a living creature possesses. “‘One is how much neurological hardware for pain reception. The other criterion is whether the animal demonstrates behavior associated with pain.” (Wallace 248). Lobsters demonstrate these behaviors associated with pain, and not only that, but they are also more susceptible to experiencing pain. “‘Lobsters do not, on the other hand, appear to have the equipment for making or absorbing natural opioids, which are what more advanced nervous systems use to try to handle intense pain.‘“ (Wallace 250).
A Lobster has and shows their interest and preference for being boiled in water, which is the preference to not being boiled in water, as they show through trying to avoid and escape that predicament of ever being boiled in water, much less- a lobster would prefer to not being showcased- in a tank with other lobsters in an amassed pile, limiting their movement and ridding the ability to defend themselves with their claws wrapped with rubber bands; this concludes, that if a lobster has enough of a preference and exhibits that preference of not wanting to be killed; then it has enough of a preference to not wanting to be teased, with its imminent death and suffering.